

## Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 STATE 228248  
ORIGIN SS-15

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /016 R

66011

DRAFTED BY: ARA: SASHELTON

APPROVED BY: ARA: SASHELTON

S/S-O: DROBINSON

-----047139 090249Z /66

O 082025Z SEP 78

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 228248

EXDIS

FOLLOWING REPEAT MANAGUA 4197 ACTION SECSTATE 7 SEP 78.

QUOTE: C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 4197

EXDIS

DEPT ALSO PASS AS INFO TO NSC WASHDC

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PINS, PINT, XK, CS, VE, PN, NU

SUBJECT: CONVERSATION WITH SOMOZA: 7 SEPTEMBER

REF: STATE 226426 (NOTAL)

1. AMB MET FIRST THING IN MORNING, 7 SEPTEMBER, WITH SOMOZA.  
IN 30 MINUTE CONVERSATION, AMB CONVEYED INSTRUCTED MESSAGE  
THAT USG WELCOMED CARAZO'S INITIATIVE AND THAT, IF ASKED,  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 228248

WOULD SO STATE. AMB EXPRESSED BELIEF THAT AN OUTSIDER TO  
THIS LOCAL CONFLICT COULD ASSIST POLARIZED PARTIES TO SEEK A  
PEACEFUL, DEMOCRATIC SOLUTION. AMB FURTHER STATED THAT THE USG  
WAS VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THE CONTINUED DETENTION OF OPPOSITION  
LEADERS--ESPECIALLY THOSE EMPLOYING NON-VIOLENT INSTRUMENTS  
(E.G., THE GENERAL STRIKE) TO EXPRESS DISCONTENT. AMB NOTED THAT  
THE STRIKE HAD BEEN DECLARED ILLEGAL BY THE GON, BUT THAT A

REPRESSIVE SOLUTION COULD ONLY LEAD TO FURTHER RESENTMENT.

2. SOMOZA RESPONDED THAT HE HAD IMPRISONED THE LEADERS SO THAT THEY COULD "STEP DOWN THE LADDER"--E.E., THIS WOULD PROVIDE THEM AN EXCUSE TO BECOME MORE MODERATE. AMB REPLIED THAT IT SEEMED TO HIM THAT SUCH MEASURES BASICALLY ANGERED THE OPPOSITION AND DID NOT PERMIT IT TO SAVE FACE; WHEREAS THE MEDIATION PROPOSED BY CARAZO COULD ACHIEVE THE RESULT OF ALL PARTIES SAVING FACE AND FORM THE BASIS FOR A MEANINGFUL POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. I AM SURE YOU AGREE, AMB SAID, THAT IT IS IMPORTANT TO STRENGTHEN MODERATE GROUPS IN NICARAGUA, AND A MEDIATION CAN BREAK THE STALEMATE AND RESULT IN THIS. SOMOZA REPLIED THAT IT WAS "IMPOSSIBLE THAT A MAN LIKE CARAZO, WHO IS NOT MY FRIEND" COULD BE A MEDIATOR. CARAZO SHOULD SIMPLY "KICK OUT" THE FSLN FROM COSTA RICA. AMB RESPONDED THAT IT WAS DANGEROUS FOR SOMOZA, WITHOUT ESTABLISHING HIS OWN TERMS FOR MEDIATION, TO A PRIORI REJECT THE CARAZO INITIATIVE. SOMOZA ASKED, "WHAT DO YOU UNDERSTAND TO BE THE NATURE OF THIS MEDIATION? WOULD IT BE, OR IS IT, THAT CARAZO WOULD HEAR MY CASE AND THE OPPOSITION'S CASE AND MAKE A COMPROMISE, BINDING ON ALL OF US?" AMB REPLIED THAT HE WAS NOT AWARE OF THE PRECISE DETAILS OF CARAZO'S INITIATIVE, BUT, CLEARLY, THERE WERE DIFFERENT TYPES OF MEDIATION. THE FORM IMPLIED BY SOMOZA APPEARED TO BE A BINDING ARBITRATION, AMB SAID. SOMOZA TOLD AMB THAT CARAZO'S INITIATIVE WAS STARTED BY THE OPPOSITION HERE AND HE THOUGHT LITTLE COULD BE GAINED THROUGH IT. AMB RESPONDED THAT IF NEGOTIATIONS AND PEACE RESULTED, THIS WOULD BE A GREAT GAIN

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 STATE 228248

FOR NICARAGUA. NICARAGUANS APPEAR SO POLARIZED THAT NEGOTIATIONS SEEM IMPOSSIBLE WITHOUT "GOOD OFFICES" OF THIRD PARTY.

3. SOMOZA SAID THAT FORMER AMB SHELTON HAD BEEN A MEDIATOR HERE AND THAT, IN A WAY, THE AMB WAS MEDIATING NOW. AMB IMMEDIATELY INTERPOSED OBJECTION TO SUCH ANALYSIS, SAYING THAT AMB WAS NOT MEDIATING, BUT WAS SIMPLY COUNSELING MODERATION AND SUGGESTING NEGOTIATIONS. NOW, BOLDER ACTION APPEARED NECESSARY. SOMOZA SAID THAT IN THE PAST, CENTRAL AMERICAN PRESIDENTS HAD MET TO SOLVE COMMON PROBLEMS. NOW A "NEW MONOALITH" WAS SUGGESTED. BEFORE GIVING A FINAL OPINION ON THIS MATTER, HE WOULD HAVE TO DETERMINE WHAT THE CENTRAL AMERICAN CONCENSUS WAS, ADDING THAT THERE WAS A PROPOSAL FOR A CENTRAL AMERICAN PRESIDENTS MEETING TO DISCUSS CACM ISSUES AND HINTED THAT THIS MIGHT BE THE FORUM TO DISCUSS NICARAGUA AS A MATTER OF COMMON CONCERN.

4. SOMOZA THEN CRITIIZED CARLOS ANDRES PEREZ, MENTIONING THAT "ZERO" HAD MET WITH HIM AND HAD TOLD PEREZ THAT SOMOZA WOULD FALL WITHIN SIX MONTHS. ONLY PANAMA AND VENEZUELA WERE PUSHING FOR AN OAS RESOLUTION, HE SAID. IF HE DID NOT HAVE A LOT ON EXPERIENCE WITH POLARIZATION AND CONFLICT, WHICH HE CHARACTERIZED

AS ENDEMIC TO NICARAGUA, HE WOULD BE CONCERNED, BUT HE HAS  
CONFIDENT HE COULD OVERCOME THE CRITICISM.

5. SOMOZA ASKED AMB TO TELL WASHINGTON, 1) HE WANTED A DEFINITION,  
SPECIFICALLY FOR THE OPPOSITION, OF WHAT IS MEANT BY "PEACEFUL  
DEMOCRATIC CHANGE." WHEN IT BECAME CLEAR THAT THIS DID NOT MEAN  
HIS OVERTHROW, "THE OPPOSITION WILL CHANGE ITS TUNE." 2) THAT THE  
SITUATION IS UNDER CONTROL HERE. 3) THAT HE HOPED THAT THE US  
WOULD ABSTAIN IN THE OAS AS A TRADE-OFF FOR NICARAGUA'S EAR-  
LIER VOTE ON THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC. (NOTE: THIS REFERS TO THE  
1965 INTERVENTION. END NOTE).

6. COMMENT: SOMOZA APPEARS CONFIDENT HE CAN SURMOUNT THE PRESENT  
CRISIS AND HE IS RELUCTANT TO ACCEPT ANY MEDIATION WHICH COULD  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 STATE 228248

UNDERMINE HIS 1981 FORMULA. HE SEEMS UNAWARE OF OR  
DOESN'T CARE ABOUT THE EXTENT OF NATIONAL OPPOSITION SENTI-  
MENT AND HAS DECIDED TO REPLY ON GON MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AD-  
VANTAGES TO LET THE GENERAL STRIKE RUN ITS COURSE AND  
PETER OUT. AMB BELIEVES HE IS CONTEMPLATING THE POSSIBILITY OF  
TAKING THE SUBSTANCE FROM CARAZO'S EFFORT, OUT MANEUVERING  
CENTRAL AMERICAN PRESIDENTS (WHO HE CONSIDERS INFERIOR TO HIM).  
AND POSSIBILITY MAKING COUNTERPROPOSALS IN A MEETING WITH CEN-  
TRAL AMERICAN PRESIDENTS.  
SOLAUN

UNQUOTE CHRISTOPHER

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** Z  
**Capture Date:** 01 jan 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, NEGOTIATIONS, PEACE TALKS, POLITICAL SITUATION  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 08 sep 1978  
**Decaption Date:** 20 Mar 2014  
**Decaption Note:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 20 Mar 2014  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1978STATE228248  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** ARA:SASHELTON  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Expiration:**  
**Film Number:** D780367-0321  
**Format:** TEL  
**From:** STATE  
**Handling Restrictions:**  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1978/newtext/t19780986/aaaactpc.tel  
**Line Count:** 148  
**Litigation Code IDs:**  
**Litigation Codes:**  
**Litigation History:**  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Message ID:** 75261054-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Office:** ORIGIN SS  
**Original Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** EXDIS  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 3  
**Previous Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Previous Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** EXDIS  
**Reference:** 78 STATE 226426  
**Retention:** 0  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 12 jul 2005  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**SAS ID:** 1498691  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** CONVERSATION WITH SOMOZA: 7 SEPTEMBER  
**TAGS:** PINS, PINT, XK, CS, VE, PN, NU, US  
**To:** SAN SALVADOR GUATEMALA MULTIPLE  
**Type:** TE  
**vdkgvwkey:** odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS\_Docs/75261054-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Review Markings:**  
Sheryl P. Walter  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
20 Mar 2014  
**Markings:** Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014